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W.: Evidence--Admissibility of a Son's Admissions Against His Father
STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF A SON'S ADMISSIONS AGAINST

HIS FATHER.-Action was brought against a father for
personal injuries sustained by reason of the alleged
negligent operation of the family automobile by the
defendant's infant son. The plaintiff offered in evidence
a statement of the son, made to a bystander about fifteen
or twenty minutes after the accident, to the effect that
he had been travelling forty-five miles per hour when he
passed a point about one-eighth of a mile from the scene
of the collision. Held, that the evidence was properly
admitted as a part of the res gestae, and as an admission
of an agent, binding on his principal. Ambrose v. Young,
130 S.E. 810 (W. Va. 1925).
The second ground of the court's opinion presents a new
angle of a doctrine which is itself of comparatively recent
origin in West Virginia. In Jones v. Cook, 90 W. Va. 710,
121 S. E. 828, it was decided that a paterfamilias is liable
to third persons for injuries caused by the wrongful operation of the family automobile by members of the family
for whose pleasure and convenience the car was provided.
The ground assigned for the decision was that in furthering the purposes of the owner by operating the car for
pleasure, the members of his family became his agents or
servants.
That decision was followed in Aggleson v.
Kendall, 29 W. Va. 138. 114 S.E. 454. and is re-affirmed
in the principal case. Considerable doubt of the correctness of such a doctrine, on grounds of agency, has been
expressed. See the dissenting opinion of Poffenbarger, P.,
in Jones v. Cook, supra; Doran v. Thomsen, 76 N. J. L.
754, 71 Atl. 296; Van Blaricon v. Dodgson, 220 N. Y. 111,
115 N. E. 443. Commentators have justified the conclusion
reached in such cases, not on principles of master and servant, but (more properly, it would seem) on grounds
of practical public necessity. 8 JOUR. AM. BAR ASSN.,
359; 33 YALE L. J. 780; 38 HARv. L. REV. 513. Our
court apparently had this consideration in mind when it
said in Jones v. Cook, "This doctrine puts the financial responsibility of the owner behind the automobile while it is
being used by a member of the family (who is likely to be
financially irresponsible) * * * * "; and also when, in the
same case, it quoted with approval this passage from King
v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 204 Si W. 296, "If an instru-
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mentality of this kind is placed in the hands of his family
by a father, for the family's pleasure, comfort, and entertainment, the dictates of natural justice should require that
the owner should be responsible for its negligent operation,
because, only by doing so, as a general rule, can substantial
justice be attained * * * * . An automobile cannot be
compared with golf sticks or other small articles bought
for the pleasure of the family". The welfare of the public
in an automobile age probably demands some such doctrine as that; but does it demand that all the incidents of
agency attach as between father and family, so that the
father will be liable not only for what the son does with
-the automobile, but also for what he says about it? Carried to its ultimate conclusion, the agency relationship probably requires that result. Will it also require that our
courts entertain suits by fathers against their sons when
third persons whom the sons have injured have recovered
against the principal? Memphis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Greer, 87
Tenn. 698, 11 S. W. 931. Or that a son may recover against
his father when the latter has negligently furnished an
unsafe automobile as an appliance for the achievement of
family pleasure? Bertha Zinc Co. v. Martin's Admr., 93
Va. 791, 22 S. E. 869. Very cogent considerations of
public policy would make these results undesirable. I.
SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS §691.
While the symmetry of our law probably demands that an agent for
one purpose be an agent for all purposes, the "dictates of
natural justice" might perhaps be better obeyed without
that perfect degree. of consistency. Having deemed the
son an agent for the purpose of giving the aggrieved third
person a worth-while party defendant, would it not be well
to stop there and require the parties to adjust their differences, such as questions as to the admissibility of evidence,
on other grounds? It seems that at least the scope of the
ariver's authority ought to be carefully limited so as not to
include statements affecting paternal liability, but in nowise
connected with the family pleasure, comfort, or convenience. There 4s ample authority for such a limitation,
even in cases where the agency was created by contract,
and not by family relationship. Boston, etc. Ry. Co. v.
Ordway, 140 Mass. 510, 5 N. E. 627; Vicksburg, etc. Ry.
Co. v. O'Brien, 119 U. S. 99, 7 Sup. Ct. 118, 30 L. ed 299.
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In admitting hearsay evidence on the grounds of agency,
the Virginia court has been careful to require that the
agent making the admission be doing the sort of thing he
was employed to do, both with regard to the time of admission and its subject matter. Lynchburg Telephone Co. v.
Booker, 103 Va. 594, 50 S. E. 148. As to the admissibility
of the evidence in question as a part of the res gestae, or
better as a Spontaneous Exclamation, see 25 W. VA. L.
QUAR. 341, and authorities there cited.
-J.
E. W.
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